A Manageable Solution with Meaningful Results: Illuminating Irs Enforcement of § 501(C)(3)\u27s Prohibition on Political Intervention by Zwak, Julia D.




A Manageable Solution with Meaningful Results:
Illuminating Irs Enforcement of § 501(C)(3)'s
Prohibition on Political Intervention
Julia D. Zwak
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zwak, Julia D., "A Manageable Solution with Meaningful Results: Illuminating Irs Enforcement of § 501(C)(3)'s Prohibition on
Political Intervention" (2014). Minnesota Law Review. 240.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/240





A Manageable Solution with Meaningful Results:  
Illuminating IRS Enforcement of § 501(c)(3)’s 
Prohibition on Political Intervention 
Julia D. Zwak* 
Over 1,200 pastors speak openly to their congregations in 
support of political candidates, hoping to prompt investigations 
by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and revocation of their 
organizations’ tax-exempt status.1 Catholic Answers, a nonprof-
it religious website, sues the IRS for assessing a tax penalty 
based on the organization’s allegedly political statements even 
though the IRS had reversed its position and refunded the tax 
just days before.2 The NAACP files for a tax refund of $17.65, 
baiting the IRS into a federal court battle over its public con-
demnation of a political figure.3 These real-life examples 
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 1. See Editorial, The Pulpit Should be Free of Politics, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 
8, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-irs-church-political 
-campaign-johnson-amendm-20130908-story.html (“[P]reachers have endorsed 
or opposed candidates by name during religious services, daring the IRS to 
sanction them.”); Alliance Defending Freedom, Pulpit Freedom Sunday 2013 
Participating Churches, http://www.speakupmovement.org/Church/Content/ 
pdf/PFS2013FinalParticipantListforPublishing.pdf. 
 2. Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-CV-670-IEG (AJB), 
2009 WL 3320498 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009), aff’d, 438 Fed. App’x 640 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 3. COMM’N ON ACCOUNTABILITY & POLICY FOR RELIGIOUS ORGS., GOV-
ERNMENT REGULATION OF POLITICAL SPEECH BY RELIGIOUS AND OTHER 
501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS 25 (2013), http://religiouspolicycommission.org/ 
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demonstrate the unusual lengths to which § 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt organizations have gone in attempting to force the IRS 
to clarify its application of 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), the prohibition 
on political activity for tax-exempt charities, churches, and ed-
ucational institutions.4 The rule, applied by the IRS under an 
imprecise and malleable facts and circumstances test, prohibits 
these organizations from participating or intervening in “any 
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candi-
date for public office.”5 
Penalties for violating § 501(c)(3)’s political activity prohi-
bition include a warning letter from the IRS,6 a tax penalty, or 
even revocation of tax-exempt status.7 Given the severity of this 
last possibility, organizations should have clear guidance to en-
sure compliance.8 In reality, the guidance is far from clear.9 The 
precise contours of the ban on political activity are difficult to 
define for three primary reasons. First, § 501(c)(3) was enacted 
with minimal legislative history and Congress has not precisely 
articulated its rationale for imposing the ban.10 Second, the IRS 
uses a facts and circumstances analysis to determine whether 
an organization has engaged in political activity, and it pro-
vides little guidance to assist organizations seeking to comply.11 
Third, few courts have considered the prohibition, and it is un-
likely that a court will have an opportunity to impose a more 
 
CommissionReport.aspx [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT] (citing Press Re-
lease, Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People, NAACP Will Chal-
lenge the IRS Threat in Fed. Court (Mar. 30, 2006)). 
 4. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 5. Id. 
 6. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 53. 
 7. See Tax Guide for Churches and Religious Organizations, I.R.S. Publi-
cation 1828, at 7 (2013) [hereinafter Tax Guide], available at http://www.irs 
.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf. 
 8. See, e.g., Michael Fresco, Note, Getting to “Exempt!”: Putting the Rub-
ber Stamp on Section 501(c)(3)’s Political Activity Prohibition, 80 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 3015, 3053 (2012) (proposing a bright-line rule to determine when revo-
cation of tax-exempt status is appropriate). 
 9. Cf. Janice Ryan, With Election Around the Corner, Charities Must 
Tread Carefully, NONPROFIT TIMES (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www 
.thenonprofittimes.com/news-articles/with-election-around-the-corner 
-charities-must-tread-carefully (“[T]he line between prohibited and permissi-
ble activities is murky and can be easily crossed . . . .”). 
 10. See Jennifer Rigterink, Comment, I’ll Believe It When I “C” It: Re-
thinking § 501(c)(3)’s Prohibition on Politicking, 86 TUL. L. REV. 493, 517 
(2011) (“[The] politicking ban was introduced as a floor amendment, without 
any documented necessity or rationalization.”). 
 11. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. 
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specific test because the IRS has consistently avoided litigation 
concerning the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban.12  
Despite recurring debates over these issues and periodic 
attempts at legislative reform, the prohibition remains a source 
of frustration for organizations seeking to advance their mis-
sions.13 Given the scarcity of case law or administrative rulings 
on the application of § 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban, scholar-
ly criticisms of the provision have largely been confined to 
analysis of hypothetical scenarios or the few existing instances 
of the rule’s application.14 More specific details about the nature 
and extent of § 501(c)(3) political activity ban violations could 
better inform scholarly criticism and improve proposals for leg-
islative reform. 
This Note suggests procedural changes that the IRS should 
implement to increase transparency and improve regulated or-
ganizations’ understanding of its enforcement efforts. Part I 
discusses the history of the political activity ban, including re-
cent enforcement efforts by the IRS. Part II examines proposals 
for reform posed by scholars, practitioners, and the IRS itself. 
Part III proposes enhanced administrative procedures that en-
courage the IRS to consistently report its investigations of 
§ 501(c)(3) political activity ban violations. In particular, this 
Note suggests that the IRS publish reports detailing its appli-
cation of the facts and circumstances test to illuminate its en-
forcement efforts. Such procedures will assist § 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt organizations seeking to tailor their activities to the tax 
code’s current guidelines and will solve many of the problems 
posed by the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF § 501(C)(3)’S POLITICAL 
ACTIVITY BAN   
To further illustrate the problems underlying IRS enforce-
ment of the political activity ban, this Part provides a brief his-
 
 12. See Erik W. Stanley, LBJ, the IRS, and Churches: The Unconstitu-
tionality of the Johnson Amendment in Light of Recent Supreme Court Prece-
dent, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 237, 260 (2012) (describing how the IRS has 
avoided litigation of its enforcement efforts relating to the political activity 
ban). 
 13. See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 3–4 (“Given the 
untenable mix of vagueness in the law, violations without consequences, lim-
ited and inconsistent enforcement, and the lack of respect for the law and its 
administration that inevitably results, something needs to change.”). 
 14. See id. at 22–26 (providing examples of “the rare and controversial 
cases in which the IRS has initiated enforcement action”). 
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tory of the ban since its inception in 1954. Section A describes 
the basic textual parameters of the ban and how they developed 
over time. Section B identifies existing sources of guidance for 
organizations attempting to comply with the provision. Section 
C concludes with a description of IRS enforcement efforts in the 
past decade and recent public debate around the provision. 
A. THE PARAMETERS OF THE PROHIBITION 
This Note begins its analysis with the text of this problem-
atic rule. Both the legislative history of § 501(c)(3)’s political ac-
tivity ban and the text of the provision itself are brief. This Sec-
tion describes each in turn. 
1. Congressional Origins 
Based on “the benefit the public obtains from their activi-
ties,” Congress has granted tax privileges to religious, charita-
ble, scientific, and educational organizations since the early 
twentieth century.15 In 1913, Congress determined that non-
profit entities “organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, or educational purposes” would be exempt 
from federal income taxation.16 Through the War Revenue Act 
of 1917, taxpayers making contributions to such organizations 
were granted a deduction in calculating their annual income 
tax.17 These benefits have persisted for the past century, alt-
hough Congress has made some modifications.  
In 1934, Congress enacted a new rule limiting the lobbying 
activities of organizations exempt from taxation under 
§ 501(c)(3).18 If a substantial part of an organization’s activities 
consisted of “carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, 
to influence legislation,” it could no longer qualify for tax-
exemption.19 This provision was enacted in response to a 1930 
decision by the Second Circuit, which held the American Birth 
Control League was not entitled to exemption because it en-
gaged in propaganda seeking to influence legislation, an action 
which went beyond an exclusively religious, educational, or sci-
entific purpose.20 Congress considered placing additional re-
 
 15. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 
854 (10th Cir. 1972). 
 16. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.G(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913). 
 17. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917). 
 18. Income Tax Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 101(6), 48 Stat. 700, 700 (1934). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 185–86 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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strictions on “participation in partisan politics”21 but chose to 
only limit lobbying activities because the ban would otherwise 
be “too broad.”22  
Twenty years later, Congress again had the opportunity to 
consider whether § 501(c)(3) organizations should be further 
restrained in the political sphere. Lyndon B. Johnson proposed 
the political activity ban in the midst of his 1954 reelection 
campaign for U.S. Senate.23 Johnson’s campaign was threat-
ened by the involvement of two particularly active § 501(c)(3) 
organizations that were outwardly supportive of Johnson’s op-
ponent and critical of Johnson’s politics.24 In what many schol-
ars have characterized as an attempt to silence his opponents,25 
Johnson proposed an amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) which 
would deny tax-exempt status to “those who intervene in any 
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for any public of-
fice.”26 The amendment’s legislative history is sparse; Johnson 
briefly stated his proposal with no explanation of its rationale 
or motivation.27 Further, as one commentator has pointed out, 
“[t]here was no referral to a committee for further study and 
hearings,” and “[t]here was no legislative analysis of the effect 
of the Amendment on tax-exempt organizations.”28 Unlike the 
lobbying restrictions imposed in 1934, this amendment imposed 
a complete ban on political activity of any kind.29 Despite the 
significant restriction this presented for § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions and the lack of informed debate on the proposal, the 
Johnson Amendment became law in 1954.30  
 
 21. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 73D CONG., REVENUE ACT OF 1934, at 
32 (Comm. Print 1934). 
 22. 78 CONG. REC. 7831 (1934) (statement of Rep. Samuel B. Hill). 
 23. Stanley, supra note 12, at 244–46. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Why the IRS Should Want To Develop Rules 
Regarding Charities and Politics, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 671–72 (2012) 
(“Many who have examined the legislative record have concluded that its mo-
tive was simply political animus . . . .”); Fresco, supra note 8, at 3020 (“It is 
now acknowledged that Johnson likely proposed the amendment in response 
to the support that certain exempt organizations gave to his rival . . . .”); cf. 
Dallas Dean, A Little Rule That Goes a Long Way: A Simplified Rule Enforcing 
the 501(c)(3) Ban on Church Campaign Intervention, 28 J.L. & POL. 307, 315 
(2013) (“The motivation for this ban has been criticized as suspect . . . .”). 
 26. 100 CONG. REC. 9604 (1954). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Stanley, supra note 12, at 248. 
 29. 100 CONG. REC. 9604 (1954). 
 30. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 501(c)(3), 68A Stat. 163, 163 
(1954). 
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2. The Text of the Ban 
Congress has since made only one minor change to the po-
litical activity ban, adding that § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organi-
zations are prohibited from not only supporting but also oppos-
ing any candidate for public office.31 In its present form, the 
political activity ban limits § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organiza-
tions to those “which [do] not participate in, or intervene in (in-
cluding the publishing or distributing of statements), any polit-
ical campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate 
for public office.”32  
Congress delegated the task of enforcing the Internal Rev-
enue Code to the IRS, which has the authority to promulgate 
regulations that carry the force of law.33 The IRS regulations 
under § 501(c)(3) provide minor clarifications relating to the po-
litical activity ban. First, the regulations prohibit political ac-
tivity that “directly or indirectly” intervenes in any political 
campaign.34 Second, the regulations provide a definition of 
“candidate for public office.”35 Finally, the regulations provide 
that prohibited activities under the political activity ban “in-
clude, but are not limited to, the publication or distribution of 
written or printed statements or the making of oral statements 
on behalf of or in opposition to such a candidate.”36 Using a 
term not found in the statute itself, the regulations label organ-
izations that violate the political activity ban as “action organi-
zations.”37 These regulations and the statute itself contain the 
complete authoritative text of the political activity ban.  
B. GUIDANCE FOR ORGANIZATIONS SEEKING TO COMPLY WITH 
THE BAN 
Along with the text of the statute and regulations, tax-
exempt organizations have some guidance for understanding 
the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban from the IRS and the 
courts. As this Section will show, however, this guidance is lim-
 
 31. See Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10,711, 101 Stat. 
1330-382, 1330-464 (1987). 
 32. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 33. Id. § 7805(a). 
 34. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (2012). 
 35. Id. (“The term candidate for public office means an individual who of-
fers himself, or is proposed by others, as a contestant for an elective public of-
fice, whether such office be national, State, or local.” (emphases omitted)). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3).  
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ited. First, this Section describes the most useful IRS guidance 
for § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations in this area. Next, it 
discusses the limited case law interpreting the rule. 
1. IRS “Guidance” 
In addition to Treasury Regulations, the IRS publishes 
Revenue Rulings, which examine hypothetical scenarios to clar-
ify how the IRS thinks the law applies to a given set of facts.38 
In 2007, the IRS published its most comprehensive attempt to 
clarify the political activity ban through such guidance.39 Reve-
nue Ruling 2007-41 provides twenty-one hypothetical scenarios 
and addresses whether the hypothetical organizations “partici-
pated or intervened in a political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office within the mean-
ing of section 501(c)(3).”40 The scenarios are grouped into cate-
gories covering activities such as voter education, individual ac-
tivity by organization leaders, candidate appearances, and 
issue advocacy.41 Some categories include lists of factors that 
will be taken into account to determine whether improper polit-
ical activity has taken place.42 
The examples in Revenue Ruling 2007-41 demonstrate that 
the IRS uses a case-specific facts and circumstances analysis to 
determine whether an organization has violated § 501(c)(3)’s 
political activity ban.43 This method of analysis builds on prior 
Revenue Rulings addressing specific areas of activity such as 
voter education44 and candidate forums.45 The determination in 
these examples often depends on such factors as the timing of 
 
 38. Id. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (“The purpose of publishing revenue rulings and 
revenue procedures in the Internal Revenue Bulletin is to . . . assist taxpayers 
in attaining maximum voluntary compliance.”). 
 39. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. 
 40. Id. at 1421. 
 41. Id. at 1422–24. 
 42. Id. at 1424.  
 43. See id. at 1422 (“[A]ll the facts and circumstances are considered in 
determining whether an organization’s activities result in political campaign 
intervention.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154 (describing voter education 
activities that will not be deemed political activity under § 501(c)(3)); Rev. Rul. 
80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178 (illustrating circumstances under which a newsletter 
identifying the voting records of Congressional incumbents will be deemed ap-
propriate activity under the political activity ban). 
 45. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73 (describing how a § 501(c)(3) 
tax-exempt organization can present a candidate forum without violating the 
political activity prohibition). 
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the activity, whether the activity is part of the organization’s 
usual activities outside of election season, and whether the ac-
tivity relates to an issue that has divided political candidates 
for a specific office.46  
For a number of reasons, Revenue Ruling 2007-41 falls 
short in providing practical guidance for § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions. First, many of the hypothetical scenarios fail to identify a 
rationale for the conclusion regarding whether political activity 
has occurred.47 Second, the facts and circumstances test is not 
articulated in any specific form; no comprehensive list of factors 
is presented, and the factors identified under certain categories 
are not weighed in terms of importance.48 Third, the twenty-one 
examples are presented as isolated occurrences involving only 
one type of activity.49 The Revenue Ruling specifically address-
es this fact, stating that “[i]n the case of an organization that 
combines one or more types of activity, the interaction among 
the activities may affect the determination.”50 The IRS has clar-
ified that the conclusions in a Revenue Ruling are “directly re-
sponsive to and limited in scope by the pivotal facts” present-
ed.51 Therefore, unless an organization finds itself in the precise 
factual situation as one of the hypothetical organizations, it 
cannot rely on Revenue Ruling 2007-41 as an authoritative 
guide. While Revenue Ruling 2007-41 sheds some light on what 
the IRS considers to be a violation of the political activity ban, 
it also leaves much open to interpretation. 
Another potential source of IRS guidance is a private letter 
ruling. Tax-exempt organizations may request a private letter 
ruling to seek an explanation of how the IRS might treat cer-
tain activities under § 501(c)(3).52 A letter ruling is “a written 
statement issued to a taxpayer by [the IRS] that interprets and 
applies the tax laws or any nontax laws applicable to . . . ex-
empt organizations to the taxpayer’s specific set of facts.”53 For 
two reasons, however, this option may be infeasible and un-
 
 46. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1423–24. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1422. 
 51. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(a) (2012). 
 52. See Exempt Organizations - Private Letter Rulings and Determination 
Letters, IRS (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/ 
Charitable-Organizations/Exempt-Organizations-Private-Letter-Rulings-and 
-Determination-Letters. 
 53. Rev. Proc. 2014-4, 2014-1 I.R.B. 125, 129. 
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workable for tax-exempt organizations attempting to comply 
with § 501(c)(3)’s prohibition on political activity.  
First, the expense of a private letter ruling request is not 
insignificant. The IRS requires organizations to submit a fee of 
$10,000 before it will consider a request for a private letter rul-
ing.54 In addition, an organization cannot request a private let-
ter ruling through a simple phone call or letter to the IRS. The 
IRS requires organizations to follow a complex process involv-
ing many detailed steps in order to obtain a private letter rul-
ing.55 Many of these steps involve legal analysis for which an 
organization would likely wish to seek the advice of an attor-
ney.56 Combined with the $10,000 fee, the expense of legal ad-
vice would likely be insurmountable for many tax-exempt or-
ganizations, particularly small charities and non-profit 
organizations.57 
Second, a private letter ruling may not be an ideal source 
of guidance for organizations attempting to respond to time-
sensitive policy issues approaching the line of candidate-related 
political activity. Private letter rulings are processed as the IRS 
receives them, and requests for expedited processing are 
“granted only in rare and unusual cases.”58 The IRS thus “urges 
all taxpayers to submit their requests well in advance of the 
contemplated transaction.”59 A tax-exempt organization may 
 
 54. Rev. Proc. 2014-8, 2014-1 I.R.B. 242, 247; see also Rev. Proc. 2014-4, 
2014-1 I.R.B. 125, 139. 
 55. See Rev. Proc. 2014-4, 2014-1 I.R.B. 125, 163–65 (listing the required 
steps for obtaining a private letter ruling in a three-page checklist containing 
thirty-three separate items); id. at 130 (explaining that the IRS will not issue 
private letter rulings in response to oral requests). 
 56. See id. at 139–45. Each private letter ruling request must contain the 
following components: a statement of facts, all documents related to the trans-
action, a statement of supporting and contrary legal authorities, an analysis of 
the issue, a statement describing whether the issue has been ruled on or dealt 
with in a previous return, a statement regarding pending legislation that may 
affect the ruling, a statement identifying any requested deletions to be made 
for the public record of the letter ruling, the signature of the taxpayer or a rep-
resentative, and a statement affirming the veracity of all statements under 
penalty of perjury. See id.  
 57. Cf. IRS Affirms That It Only Provides Assurance on Changes in Activi-
ties by Private Letter Ruling, NONPROFIT WATCHMAN (Spring 2013), http:// 
www.nonprofitcpa.com/irs-affirms-that-it-only-provides-assurance-on-changes 
-in-activities-by-private-letter-ruling (“[T]he total cost of obtaining a PLR may 
be significant. For larger organizations or organizations for which the risk of 
noncompliance could be great, the cost may be justified in order to obtain the 
assurance of affirmation by the IRS.”). 
 58. Rev. Proc. 2014-4, 2014-1 I.R.B. 125, 146. 
 59. Id. at 147. 
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not be able to do so, however, if it wants to make a timely re-
sponse or statement regarding important pending policy mat-
ters. Further, organizations cannot proactively request a letter 
ruling about potential situations they might encounter in the 
future since the IRS refuses to issue letter rulings on “alterna-
tive plans of proposed transactions or on hypothetical situa-
tions.”60 And even if an organization presents a factual scenario 
with a live question to the IRS, the agency may decline to issue 
a letter ruling altogether if it determines that issuing a letter 
ruling would not be “appropriate in the interest of sound tax 
administration.”61 Given the significant expense and unpredict-
able timing involved in requesting a private letter ruling, this 
source of guidance cannot adequately address the problems 
posed by § 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban. 
2. Judicial Review: An Unlikely Source of Clarification 
Another potential source of authority for interpreting 
§ 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban is judicial opinions. As noted 
by a number of scholars, however, “[o]nly a very small number 
of court decisions have involved the campaign intervention 
prohibition.”62 The mechanics of the prohibition demonstrate 
why this may be so. When an organization violates the political 
activity ban, the IRS may respond by sending a warning let-
ter,63 imposing an excise tax for any expenditures incurred,64 or 
revoking the organization’s tax-exempt status.65 A warning let-
ter in itself would not likely provide the taxpayer with standing 
to sue the IRS as there is no injury in fact based on receiving a 
letter.66 An organization faced with the latter two penalties may 
 
 60. Id. at 138. 
 61. Id. at 132; see also id. at 149 (explaining that the IRS may decline to 
issue a private letter ruling).  
 62. Aprill, supra note 25, at 655. 
 63. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 53. 
 64. See 26 U.S.C. § 4955 (2012). 
 65. See id. § 501(c)(3). 
 66. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (providing 
that a plaintiff “must have suffered an ‘injury in fact,’” meaning “an invasion 
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 
actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’” in order to bring a law-
suit (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is not likely 
that the receipt of a warning letter, without more, would be deemed a concrete 
invasion of a legally protected interest. But see Edward Sherman, “No Injury” 
Plaintiffs and Standing, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 834, 835–36 (2014) (summa-
rizing various types of cases in which plaintiffs have struggled to establish 
standing and illustrating ways the “no injury” barrier might be overcome). 
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have a basis to challenge the IRS determination in court, but 
the IRS can easily avoid such litigation as described below. 
In the case of an excise tax,67 an organization that seeks to 
challenge the imposition of the tax in federal court must first 
pay the tax and request a refund by filing an administrative 
claim.68 After these steps are taken, the organization may then 
challenge the tax by filing a lawsuit.69 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of California dealt with 
this scenario in Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States.70 Cath-
olic Answers, Inc., a nonprofit religious organization, posted 
letters on its website critiquing Senator John Kerry’s views on 
a variety of political issues such as abortion.71 The IRS initiated 
a lengthy investigation and determined that Catholic Answers 
had engaged in political activity warranting the imposition of 
an excise tax in May 2008.72 Catholic Answers paid the tax but 
sought a refund from the IRS in September 2008.73 In March 
2009, the IRS notified Catholic Answers that it was abating the 
tax because it had determined that “the political interven-
tion . . . was not wilful and flagrant and was corrected.”74 Cath-
olic Answers initiated a federal lawsuit less than one week lat-
er challenging the IRS’s determination that it had engaged in 
political activity.75 The District Court did not reach the merits 
of this claim, however, finding that the IRS’s tax abatement 
rendered the refund suit moot and that the case presented no 
“issues capable of repetition yet evading review.”76 This case 
demonstrates how the IRS can avoid judicial review of its de-
termination that political activity has taken place by simply re-
 
 67. See 26 U.S.C. § 4955 (2012) (providing that the IRS may impose a tax 
on political expenditures of § 501(c)(3) organizations). See generally BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 646 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “excise” as “[a] tax imposed on 
. . . an . . . activity”). 
 68. 26 U.S.C. § 7422 (2012). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-CV-670-IEG (AJB), 
2009 WL 3320498 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009), aff’d, 438 Fed. App’x 640 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 71. Id. at *1. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at *2. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at *8. But see Church of Scientology v. United States, 485 F.2d 313, 
316 (9th Cir. 1973) (2-1 decision) (illustrating how an issue apparently mooted 
by a tax refund may be deemed “capable of repetition yet evading review” in 
limited circumstances (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing S. Pac. Termi-
nal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911))). 
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versing its position or deciding that the intervention was not 
serious enough to warrant a tax penalty.77 
In a few prominent cases, courts have reviewed the IRS’s 
decision to revoke an organization’s tax-exempt status based on 
the political activity ban. These cases illustrate that the courts 
give substantial deference to the IRS’s determinations in this 
area. In 2000, the IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of Branch 
Ministries, a § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt church, based on its in-
volvement in political activity.78 Leading up to the 1992 presi-
dential election, Branch Ministries placed a full-page adver-
tisement in two national newspapers urging Christians not to 
vote for Bill Clinton.79 A statement at the bottom of the ad stat-
ed: “Tax-deductible donations for this advertisement gladly ac-
cepted.”80 After an investigation of the church’s activities, the 
IRS revoked its tax-exempt status.81 Branch Ministries chal-
lenged the revocation as an exercise of selective prosecution in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.82 The D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld the revocation, deferring to the IRS’s 
judgment in this area.83  
The court’s treatment of Branch Ministries’ selective prose-
cution claim illustrates the significant deference granted to the 
IRS in applying the facts and circumstances test. To support its 
claim, Branch Ministries submitted “several hundred pages” of 
newspaper articles reporting on church political activity that 
had failed to come under IRS scrutiny.84 The IRS admitted that 
 
 77. See Elizabeth J. Kingsley, Challenges to “Facts and Circumstances”—
A Standard Whose Time Has Passed?, TAX’N EXEMPTS, Mar./Apr. 2010, at 43, 
47–48 (describing obstacles to judicial review for § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) or-
ganizations, drawing on the Catholic Answers case as one example).  
 78. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 140. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 141–42. Branch Ministries also challenged the revocation as a 
violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. A discussion of the 
First Amendment implications of the ban is beyond the scope of this Note. For 
thorough discussions of the First Amendment issues around the political activ-
ity ban, see generally NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAX-
ES, AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS (2011); 
Keith S. Blair, Praying for a Tax Break: Churches, Political Speech, and the 
Loss of Section 501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 405 (2009); 
H. Chandler Combest, Symbolism as Savior: A Look at the Impact of the IRS 
Ban on Political Activity by Tax-Exempt Religious Organizations, 61 ALA. L. 
REV. 1121 (2010). 
 83. Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 145. 
 84. Id. at 144.  
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some of these examples could have resulted in a finding that 
the organization violated the political activity ban,85 but the 
court rejected Branch Ministries’ selective prosecution claim 
because it “failed to demonstrate that it was similarly situated 
to any of those other churches.”86 As the court emphasized, 
“[n]one of the reported activities involved the placement of ad-
vertisements in newspapers with nationwide circulations op-
posing a candidate and soliciting tax deductible contributions 
to defray their cost.”87 Admittedly this activity by Branch Min-
istries presents a particularly egregious example of prohibited 
political activity under § 501(c)(3). Nevertheless, the court’s de-
cision highlights how difficult it would be for an organization to 
obtain meaningful judicial review of the IRS’s facts and circum-
stances analysis. Because the IRS has such latitude and flexi-
bility in considering the unique facts of a given case, a court 
will be unlikely to impose a more exacting analysis or imple-
ment a more specific test. 
Another reason that courts would be unlikely to challenge 
the IRS’s revocation of tax-exempt status is that the IRS likely 
reserves this penalty for the most clear—and obviously politi-
cal—violations.88 Although IRS guidance on the prohibition is 
not altogether clear, Branch Ministries’ advertisement could 
not be understood as anything other than an attempt to inter-
vene in an election.89 Other cases similarly illustrate the clearly 
political circumstances warranting revocation. The Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals upheld the IRS’s revocation of a religious 
organization’s § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status when it “attacked 
President Kennedy . . . and urged its followers to elect con-
servatives like Senator Strom Thurmond.”90 The organization 
went on to name more specific candidates in its publications 
and broadcasts.91 In another case, the Second Circuit upheld 
the IRS’s decision to deny tax-exempt status to an organization 
when it published ratings of judicial candidates identifying 
whether they were “approved,” “not approved,” or “approved as 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Cf. Aprill, supra note 25, at 655 (describing how Branch Ministries in-
volved “undisputed express intervention”). 
 89. See id. 
 90. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 
856 (10th Cir. 1972). 
 91. Id. 
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highly qualified.”92 In each of these examples, the organizations 
engaged in activity that can clearly be identified as an attempt 
to intervene in or influence an election. Judicial review of the 
IRS’s decisions in these cases, therefore, does little more than 
reiterate the obvious. 
C. RECENT ATTEMPTS AT REFORM 
In response to the problems posed by the political activity 
ban, the IRS has taken action in the past decade to enhance its 
enforcement efforts against § 501(c)(3) organizations. This Sec-
tion first describes the IRS’s efforts and then identifies existing 
debates around the remaining problems with the prohibition. It 
concludes with a description of recent developments in a relat-
ed area—IRS regulation of politically active § 501(c)(4) social 
welfare organizations. 
1. The Political Activities Compliance Initiative 
Acknowledging that “[t]he issue of political campaign in-
tervention by § 501(c)(3) organizations presents unique chal-
lenges,”93 the IRS developed a program known as the Political 
Activities Compliance Initiative (PACI) to “promote compliance 
with the IRC § 501(c)(3) prohibition against political campaign 
intervention.”94 The IRS repeated this initiative during three 
successive elections in 2004, 2006, and 2008.95 PACI involved a 
“fast track” process through which IRS agents would screen re-
ferrals of § 501(c)(3) violations on an expedited basis.96 The 
team identified the cases as complex, non-complex, or not war-
ranting examination.97 PACI also involved a separate method-
ology for examining churches as required under the Church 
Audit Procedures Act.98 Through PACI, the IRS hoped to estab-
lish its “enforcement presence” and “reinforce [its] education ef-
forts.”99  
 
 92. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n v. Comm’r, 858 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 93. IRS, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE FINAL REPORT 1 
(2006), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/final_paci_report.pdf [hereinafter 2004 
PACI REPORT]. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Aprill, supra note 25, at 659–62 (describing the PACI program). 
 96. 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93, at 2. 
 97. Id. at 6. 
 98. See id. at 2; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7611 (2012) (outlining the methodolo-
gy the IRS follows for a church tax inquiry). 
 99. 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93, at 1. 
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The IRS prepared reports summarizing its findings in both 
the 2004 and 2006 PACI initiatives,100 but failed to do so for the 
2008 election cycle.101 During the three PACI cycles, the IRS in-
vestigated more than 250 organizations.102 Seven organizations 
had their tax-exempt status revoked based on violations of the 
political activity ban.103 As the IRS explained in its 2004 PACI 
Report,104 it is unable to discuss the specific details of these in-
vestigations based on 26 U.S.C. § 6103, which ensures the con-
fidentiality of tax returns and information contained therein.105 
Detailed information is only available when organizations pub-
licly acknowledge that they have been selected for IRS scruti-
ny.106 
Despite its inability to publicize the specific facts and cir-
cumstances involved in the 250 PACI investigations, the IRS 
used PACI data to develop the twenty-one hypothetical scenar-
ios identified in Revenue Ruling 2007-41.107 In its 2010 Annual 
Report, the IRS Exempt Organizations Division suggests that 
future PACI initiatives will be incorporated into more formal 
processes as the IRS “move[s] review of allegations of political 
 
 100. Id.; IRS, 2006 POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (2007), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2006paci_report_5-30-07.pdf [hereinafter 2006 
PACI REPORT]. 
 101. See EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, IRS, TAX EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENT 
ENTITIES (2010), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/fy2011_eo_workplan.pdf 
[hereinafter 2010 ANNUAL REPORT]; cf. Aprill, supra note 25, at 662 (“The 
2010 Annual Report from the director of exempt organizations provides the 
only information on the 2008 PACI.”). 
 102. 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 101, at 20. 
 103. Id. 
 104. 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93, at 2. 
 105. 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012); see also Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaign-
ing by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for De-
mocracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1355–56 (2007) (“Under section 6103 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, the IRS is prohibited from releasing taxpayer information 
in all but very limited circumstances . . . [and] is therefore prohibited from dis-
closing whether a particular 501(c)(3) organization is being investigated or, if 
it is, the resolution of any case.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 82, at 429–32 (describing the IRS’s investi-
gation of All Saints Church, which consciously chose to make the investigation 
public). 
 107. See Political Activity Compliance Initiative (2006 Election), IRS (June 
25, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable 
-Organizations/Political-Activity-Compliance-Initiative-(2006-Election) 
(“Building on the experience gained through its compliance projects, the IRS 
issued Revenue Ruling 2007-41.”).  
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campaign intervention from project to process.”108 It is not clear 
at this time whether these processes have been put in place.  
2. Current Dialogue: The Debate Is Not Over  
Although the PACI program has faded out of the public’s 
attention, debates surrounding the political activity of 
§ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations persist. The Pulpit Free-
dom Sunday initiative109 is an extreme example of the public 
call for reform. Started in 2008 by Alliance Defending Freedom, 
a national conservative nonprofit organization that seeks to de-
fend religious liberty, Pulpit Freedom Sunday encourages pas-
tors and other religious leaders to speak openly about political 
candidates to their congregants once per year.110 The goal of 
this movement is “to generate test cases [to] carry to the U.S. 
Supreme Court” in order to challenge the constitutionality of 
the political activity ban.111 In response to such church political 
activity, the Freedom From Religion Foundation filed a federal 
lawsuit urging the IRS to actively enforce its own regulations.112 
Although the IRS has largely ignored Pulpit Freedom Sunday 
for many years,113 it recently affirmed that it “does not have a 
policy at this time of non-enforcement specific to churches and 
religious institutions.”114 Some commentators have nonetheless 
called for more aggressive enforcement against such politically 
active tax-exempt organizations. For example, a September 
2013 L.A. Times editorial argues that “[f]ar from needing to be 
 
 108. 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 101, at 20. 
 109. Alliance Defending Freedom, supra note 1. 
 110. See Alliance Defending Freedom, Speak Up: Pulpit Freedom Sunday 
Frequently Asked Questions 1–2, http://www.adfmedia.org/files/ChurchFAQ_ 
PulpitFreedom.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
 111. Id. at 1. 
 112. See Kate Tracy, IRS to Atheists: Okay, We’ll Investigate Pulpit Free-
dom Sunday Pastors, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (July 25, 2014, 11:33 AM), 
http://www.christianitytoday.com/gleanings/2014/july/irs-to-atheists-okay 
-well-investigate-pulpit-freedom-sunday.html.  
 113. See Joan Frawley Desmond, U.S. Supreme Court Denies Appeal in 
First Amendment Case, NAT’L CATHOLIC REG. (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www 
.ncregister.com/daily-news/u.s.-supreme-court-denies-appeal-in-first 
-amendment-case (“Many sources indicate the IRS has not taken action 
against electioneering churches for three years.”). 
 114. Decision and Order, Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Koskinen, 
No. 12-C-0818, 2014 WL 3811050, at *1–2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 1, 2014), available 
at http://ffrf.org/uploads/legal/IRS-Politicking-Decision.pdf (granting a joint 
motion for dismissal in a case filed by the Freedom From Religion Foundation 
against the IRS for its persistent failure to investigate church political activi-
ty).  
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repealed, the ban on politics in the pulpit ought to be enforced 
more aggressively.”115 Although the most vociferous appeals 
seem to surround the activity of churches in particular, secular 
charities and nonprofit institutions have also weighed in. For 
example, two commentators criticized the IRS’s “amorphous” 
facts and circumstances test in a recent article in The Chronicle 
of Philanthropy.116 One author suggested that under current 
rules, IRS staff have “no clearer a criterion than ‘knowing polit-
ical activity when they view it.’”117 With opinions along all 
points of the spectrum, it appears that both the public and the 
tax-exempt organizations subject to the rule are ready to see 
significant changes in IRS enforcement of § 501(c)(3)’s political 
activity ban. 
Despite the continued debate in the public sphere, Con-
gress has not acted to alter the political activity ban. In the 
years preceding PACI up until the present, many legislators 
have proposed bills seeking to repeal or amend the rule, but 
none of these proposals has led to a change.118 A recent example 
introduced by Representative Walter B. Jones seeks to repeal 
the political activity ban in its entirety “[t]o restore the Free 
Speech and First Amendment rights of churches and exempt 
organizations.”119 This bill was referred to the House Ways and 
Means Committee in January 2013,120 but appears to have 
stalled without further comment. In early 2011, Senator 
Charles Grassley commissioned a report addressing potential 
changes to the political activity ban.121 This comprehensive re-
port, drafted by the newly formed Commission on Accountabil-
ity and Policy for Religious Organizations, was completed in 
August 2013.122 Another group of tax law experts and practi-
tioners known as the Bright Lines Project also recently submit-
ted proposed rule changes to Congress.123 It remains unclear, 
however, what will be done with these new proposals. 
 
 115. Editorial, supra note 1. 
 116. Ellen P. Aprill & Lisa Gilbert, Fixing the IRS: Clarify the Rules on Po-
litical Involvement, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (June 3, 2013), http:// 
philanthropy.com/article/article-content/139583. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See generally Rigterink, supra note 10, at 500–01 (summarizing Con-
gressional proposals to amend § 501(c)(3) since 2001). 
 119. H.R. 127, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
 120. Id. 
 121. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See Gregory L. Colvin, Bright Lines Project Submits Legislation to 
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3. New Proposed Rules for § 501(c)(4) Social Welfare 
Organizations 
A recent development at the IRS has raised new opportuni-
ties for continued debate around the political activity ban. In 
May 2013, the IRS admitted to applying greater scrutiny in re-
viewing conservative organizations’ applications for tax-exempt 
status over a period of three years.124 This news prompted a 
public outcry, a criminal investigation, and overhaul of the IRS 
administration.125 Responding to these events, the IRS issued a 
set of Proposed Treasury Regulations seeking to alter the rules 
governing the political activity of § 501(c)(4) social welfare or-
ganizations.126  
Organizations exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(4) are 
those “operated exclusively for the promotion of social wel-
fare.”127 An organization qualifies as a social welfare organiza-
tion if “it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the 
common good and general welfare of the people of the commu-
nity.”128 Under existing regulations, “[t]he promotion of social 
welfare does not include “direct or indirect participation or in-
tervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to 
any candidate for public office.”129 The IRS applies this rule us-
ing a facts and circumstances analysis, similar to the 
§ 501(c)(3) political activity ban.130 Unlike § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions, however, social welfare organizations may engage in 
some amount of political activity.131 Due to the unclear defini-
tion of political intervention and the difficulty of quantifying a 
 
Congress To Fix Tax Law on Political Activity, NONPROFIT L. MATTERS (July 
16, 2013), http://bit.ly/19LvLng. 
 124. See generally Sean Sullivan, Everything You Need To Know About the 
IRS Scandal, FIX-WASH. POST (May 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/05/21/what-we-know-and-what-we-dont-about-the 
-irs-scandal (providing a summary of the targeting scandal and explaining 
what was known about it within the first few weeks after the IRS announced 
its activities). 
 125. See id. 
 126. I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-92 (Nov. 26, 2013); see also Stephen 
Dinan, IRS Moves To Clean Up Scandal of Tea Party Targeting, WASH. TIMES 
(Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/26/irs-moves 
-clean-tea-party-targeting-scandal-proble. 
 127. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2012). 
 128. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2012). 
 129. Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii). 
 130. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,536 (Nov. 
29, 2013) (comparing the application of the facts and circumstances test for 
§ 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations). 
 131. Id. 
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§ 501(c)(4) organization’s social welfare activity compared to its 
political intervention, these rules have also been a source of 
significant confusion.132 
In late November 2013, the IRS proposed new regulations 
to clarify its enforcement in this area. In its proposed regula-
tions, the IRS uses a new term—“candidate-related political ac-
tivity”—to describe what will be deemed political interven-
tion.133 This term is defined by a list of specific activities such as 
expressly advocating for a candidate or making contributions.134 
The IRS acknowledges that this set of rules may be over- or 
under-inclusive when compared with a facts and circumstances 
analysis, but argues that “adopting rules with sharper distinc-
tions . . . would provide greater certainty and reduce the need 
for detailed factual analysis.”135 This approach marks a major 
shift from the amorphous facts and circumstances approach 
that the IRS has used for decades and indicates a potential for 
widespread reform of IRS enforcement against politically active 
tax-exempt organizations. 
However, the IRS has made it clear that its new regula-
tions would not apply to § 501(c)(3) organizations. In the IRS’s 
view, “because [political] intervention is absolutely prohibited 
under section 501(c)(3), a more nuanced consideration of the to-
tality of the facts and circumstances may be appropriate in that 
context.”136 The IRS hinted that it may consider changing this 
view by inviting the public to comment specifically on whether 
the proposed rules or a similar set of regulations would be ap-
propriate in the § 501(c)(3) context.137  
The public welcomed this invitation with zeal. The IRS re-
ceived a record-setting number of public comments on the pro-
posed regulations138—greater than 150,000 based on recent es-
timates.139 Along all points of the political spectrum, the 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(iii), 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,541. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. at 71,536–37. 
 136. Id. at 71,537. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Rick Cohen, 143,764 Comments Submitted to IRS on Proposed 
501(c)(4) Regulations, NONPROFIT Q. (Mar. 11, 2014, 2:48 PM), http:// 
nonprofitquarterly.org/policysocial-context/23825-143-764-comments 
-submitted-to-irs-on-proposed-501-c-4-regulations.html. 
 139. Julie Patel, IRS Chief Promises Stricter Rules for “Dark Money” Non-
profit Groups, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 18, 2014), http://www 
.publicintegrity.org/2014/06/18/14960/irs-chief-promises-stricter-rules-dark 
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comments offered robust criticisms of the proposed regulations, 
noting their overbreadth, potential to inhibit civic engagement, 
and likely collateral effects on § 501(c)(3) organizations.140 The 
IRS’s proposed regulations have been widely recognized as a 
failed attempt, with one commentator suggesting that they are 
“dead in the water”141 and another deeming them “an abomina-
tion.”142 The IRS intends to publish a new set of proposed rules 
in early 2015 and will seek additional public input before mov-
ing forward with any final regulations.143 The November 2013 
proposed regulations applied to § 501(c)(4) tax-exempt organi-
zations alone, and the IRS does not plan to include § 501(c)(3) 
organizations in its next round of rulemaking.144 Nevertheless, 
the proposed regulations have renewed vigorous debate over 
the appropriate boundaries of § 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban. 
The IRS has scaled back its aggressive enforcement efforts 
around § 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban and appears content 
with its existing guidance in Revenue Ruling 2007-41. It has 
seen room for reform in its enforcement against § 501(c)(4) so-
cial welfare organizations, but explicitly expressed a desire to 
maintain the facts and circumstances analysis under 
§ 501(c)(3). Meanwhile, Congress has not significantly changed 
the ban for over fifty years. In the midst of this stagnation, 
§ 501(c)(3) organizations and the public are calling for change. 
Part II of this Note considers some of these proposals for re-
form. 
II.  SOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY SCHOLARS, 
PRACTITIONERS, AND THE IRS   
The problems inherent in the § 501(c)(3) political activity 
ban have persisted for several decades. Acknowledging the 
complexity of the issues involved, one scholar has noted that 
meaningful reform would require a “conversation between 
 
-money-nonprofit-groups. 
 140. See Cohen, supra note 138.  
 141. Matea Gold, IRS Plan To Curb Politically Active Groups Is Threatened 




 142. Id. 
 143. Chris Vest, IRS Sheds Light on Next Attempt at Nonprofit Political 
Activity Rules, ASSOCIATIONS NOW (June 23, 2014), http://associationsnow 
.com/2014/06/irs-sheds-light-next-attempt-nonprofit-political-activity-rules. 
 144. See id. 
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lawmakers, religious and charitable leaders, and people of faith 
to reshape the foundation of American policy dealing with the 
interaction between tax exemption and politics.”145 This conver-
sation has indeed taken place, and various groups have come 
forward with proposed solutions. This section will discuss some 
of these proposals for reform. Section A identifies a variety of 
scholarly proposals to reform § 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban. 
Section B highlights two recent comprehensive proposals devel-
oped by groups of scholars and practitioners. Section C assesses 
the IRS’s PACI program with a view toward future alterna-
tives.  
A. SCHOLARLY PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Reflecting the variety of perspectives in the conversation, 
scholars have posed a wide range of solutions to the political 
activity ban. This Section first analyzes proposals that focus on 
religious organizations. Next, this Section considers proposals 
to alter the tax consequences for engaging in political speech. 
This Section concludes by identifying proposals that call for 
new rules to clarify the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban. 
1. Religious-Specific Proposals 
Many scholars have considered the § 501(c)(3) political ac-
tivity ban as it relates to churches in particular, proposing 
rules that would have their sole or primary impact on religious 
organizations. One proposal suggests that Congress create a 
new tax classification for houses of worship to free them from 
restrictions on their internal partisan political speech.146 Under 
this proposal, churches could opt into the new tax classification 
to receive the benefits of tax-exemption as long as they agree 
not to engage in political speech or agree to limit their political 
speech to purely internal communications.147 Along similar 
lines, scholars have suggested safe harbors allowing religious 
leaders to freely engage in political speech “directed internally 
to [their] congregants or others who willingly seek out such 
 
 145. Jerome Park Prather, Tax Exemption of American Churches and Oth-
er Nonprofits: One Election Cycle After Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 94 KY. 
L.J. 139, 159 (2005). 
 146. See CRIMM & WINER, supra note 82, at 323, 337–52. 
 147. Id. This suggestion is part of a larger proposal which would also re-
place the political activity ban with a rule that eliminates the tax benefits for 
donors to § 501(c)(3) organizations that engage in political speech, whether 
secular or religious. See id. at 326–37. 
ZWAK_4fmt 11/3/2014 4:46 PM 
402 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:381 
 
communication”148 or to speak “directly to their members on 
matters that walk the line between purely ‘religious’ and purely 
‘political’” speech.149 Others would “allow religious organiza-
tions to engage in political speech so long as it is related to 
their religious purpose.”150 On the other end of the spectrum, 
some would argue that the IRS should more strictly enforce the 
law as it relates to churches and revoke their tax-exempt sta-
tuses if they engage in any political speech.151 Finally, some 
suggest that the ban should not apply to churches at all be-
cause it is an unconstitutional infringement on First Amend-
ment speech and free exercise rights.152  
As these proposals indicate, the IRS faces unique challeng-
es in enforcing the political activity ban against religious organ-
izations. Many religious organizations engage in charitable ac-
tivities that closely mirror the activities of secular organiz-
ations,153 suggesting that similar enforcement makes sense. On 
the other hand, important differences exist based on the First 
Amendment concerns of limiting religious speech or subsidizing 
religion through special tax treatment. Any solution must take 
these considerations into account, but proposals that only ad-
dress church political activity will not improve the situation for 
the rest of the § 501(c)(3) organizations struggling to comply 
with the rule. Without discounting the viability of these pro-
posals, this Note encourages a solution with broader applicabil-
ity to all § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations. 
2. Altering Financial (Dis)incentives for Engaging in Political 
Speech 
Commentators have also introduced proposals that seek to 
address the problems inherent in the political activity ban 
through tax incentives. Some suggest restricting tax deductions 
 
 148. Dean, supra note 25, at 328 (emphasis omitted). 
 149. Blair, supra note 82, at 437. 
 150. 4 WILLIAM W. BASSETT, W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & ROBERT T. SMITH, 
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 17:20 (2013). 
 151. See, e.g., Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where They Have Not Sowed: 
Have American Churches Failed To Satisfy the Requirements for the Religious 
Tax Exemption?, 43 CATH. LAW 29, 79 (2004). 
 152. E.g., Stanley, supra note 12, at 282. 
 153. See Kara Backus, Note, All Saints Church and the Argument for a 
Goal-Driven Application of Internal Revenue Service Rules for Tax-Exempt Or-
ganizations, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 301, 306 (2008) (“[C]hurches are able to 
provide a vast array of services to the community. They are involved in, among 
many other things, the prevention of teen pregnancy, fighting crime and sub-
stance abuse, community development, education, and child care.”). 
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for donors contributing to politically-engaged charities or 
churches.154 Under this proposal, the political activity ban 
would be lifted, but organizations choosing to engage in politi-
cal activity could not receive tax-deductible contributions.155 
Another creative suggestion proposes allowing § 501(c)(3) or-
ganizations to elect to pay a “self-directed tax” in order to avoid 
being subject to penalties under the political activity ban.156 Or-
ganizations electing this option would pay a tax for engaging in 
political speech and could dictate which areas of spending the 
government should support with its tax dollars.157 
These proposals ignore a central problem with the political 
activity ban—the lack of clarity around what constitutes politi-
cal intervention. In order for these tax consequences to apply, 
organizations and the IRS must still identify when their activi-
ties cross the line into political activity. A lasting solution to 
the political activity ban must address this issue by giving 
§ 501(c)(3) organizations clearer guidance about how the rule is 
applied. 
3. Rule Clarification Proposals 
A third category of proposed solutions seeks to clarify the 
application of the political activity ban to improve IRS regula-
tion and enforcement. One scholar suggests that the IRS must 
produce “a more robust set of rules” to replace the current 
vague standards that govern compliance.158 Rules, she suggests, 
are better suited than standards based on “the low level of en-
forcement, the large number of affected parties, and the num-
ber of affected parties unlikely to seek legal advice.”159 Multiple 
scholars have similarly proposed that Congress or the IRS 
adopt bright-line rules for enforcing the political activity ban.160 
 
 154. CRIMM & WINER, supra note 82, at 322–23. 
 155. Id. 
 156. W. Edward Afield, Getting Faith out of the Gutters: Resolving the De-
bate over Political Campaign Participation by Religious Organizations 
Through Fiscal Subsidiarity, 12 NEV. L.J. 83, 101 (2011). 
 157. See id. 
 158. Aprill, supra note 25, at 680. 
 159. Id. at 682. 
 160. See, e.g., Kay Guinane, Wanted: A Bright-Line Test Defining Prohibit-
ed Intervention in Elections by 501(c)(3) Organizations, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 142, 155 (2007) (“There are strong public policy reasons for developing 
bright-line rules defining impermissible campaign intervention.”); see also 
Fresco, supra note 8, at 3053 (proposing the bright-line rule that “[s]peech will 
constitute revocable political intervention when it refers to a clearly identified 
candidate and reflects a view on that candidate”). 
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Developing such rules would certainly improve clarity for or-
ganizations seeking to comply with the ban. As the following 
Section will illustrate, however, such rules may not completely 
clarify the situation and depend largely on the willingness of 
Congress or the IRS to undertake comprehensive reform. 
B. TWO RECENT PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS 
Two different groups of commentators have recently devel-
oped proposals to reform IRS enforcement of the political activi-
ty ban. These proposals are worth highlighting in detail be-
cause they collectively represent the input of a broad range of 
individuals—tax professionals, academics, and leaders of non-
profit and religious organizations. Both proposals offer solu-
tions that seek to resolve the myriad concerns underlying the 
debate through legislative or regulatory change. 
1. The Bright Lines Project  
In 2009, a group of tax experts, practitioners, and nonprofit 
leaders convened to discuss changes to § 501(c)(3)’s political ac-
tivity ban.161 Since that time, nine of these individuals contin-
ued to meet to develop a proposal for change.162 This group, the 
Bright Lines Project (BLP), submitted its proposed rule chang-
es to Congress in July 2013.163 The group’s proposal advocates 
six bright-line rules that will give § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organ-
izations greater guidance in complying with the political activi-
ty ban.164  
First, the BLP proposes a clarification of the term “candi-
date” and extends the rule’s application to foreign election 
campaigns.165 Next, it suggests that the definition of “political 
intervention” be modified consistently throughout the tax code, 
not only in § 501(c)(3).166 Third, the proposal adopts the bright-
line rule that it is political intervention to “expressly advocate” 
for the election, defeat, nomination, or recall of a clearly-
identified candidate or candidates affiliated with a specific par-
 
 161. See Bright Lines Project, The Bright Lines Project: Clarifying the IRS 
Rules for Political Intervention 1 (May 2013) (draft report), http://www 
.citizen.org/documents/Bright-Lines-Proposal-(May%202013).pdf [hereinafter 
BLP Draft Report]. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See Colvin, supra note 123. 
 164. See BLP Draft Report, supra note 161, at 2. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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ty.167 This proposed rule also considers it to be political inter-
vention when an organization expressly advocates that voters 
select candidates based on one or more criteria that clearly dis-
tinguish certain candidates from others or expressly advocates 
political expenditures.168 Fourth, if an organization is not en-
gaged in express advocacy under rule three, its speech will be 
deemed political intervention if “(a) it refers to a clearly-
identified candidate and (b) it reflects a view on that candi-
date.”169 Along with this rule, the BLP proposes four safe harbor 
exceptions to such speech if the organization is attempting to 
influence an official’s actions in his or her current term of of-
fice, comparing candidates in a voter education effort, respond-
ing in self-defense to a candidate’s statement about the organi-
zation, or when the statements are personal, oral remarks at 
official meetings.170 Fifth, the BLP proposes that it should be 
deemed political intervention to provide resources to support or 
oppose any candidate’s election.171 Finally, the BLP suggests 
that communications which are political speech under rule 
four, do not fall under a safe-harbor provision, and “are target-
ed to voters in states, districts, or other locations, where close 
election contests are occurring, are conclusively political inter-
vention.”172 In other situations, organizations may provide evi-
dence of other facts and circumstances to defend their actions 
as non-political.173 
In short, these rules “seek to establish a new definition of 
political intervention that uses bright lines and safe harbors. If 
the organization’s speech is not clearly covered by that defini-
tion, it can fall back on the current ‘facts and circumstances’ 
approach in its defense.”174 
2. The Commission on Accountability and Policy for Religious 
Organizations 
Undertaking a similar effort as the BLP, the Commission 
on Accountability and Policy for Religious Organizations (The 
Commission) prepared a report for Senator Charles Grassley 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. 
 169. Id. at 3. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See id. at 4. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Id. at 1. 
ZWAK_4fmt 11/3/2014 4:46 PM 
406 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:381 
 
with recommendations to Congress and the IRS.175 This report 
was released in August 2013,176 shortly after the BLP presented 
its recommendations. The Commission, comprised of fourteen 
members and sixty-six panel members from legal, nonprofit, 
and religious communities,177 sought to “strike a necessary bal-
ance” between permitting organizations to engage in speech 
relevant to their organizations while expending funds con-
sistent with their tax-exempt purposes.178 The Commission’s 
report makes five related recommendations to achieve this 
goal. 
First, the report recommends that the political activity ban 
should not be repealed.179 Next, it proposes an exception to the 
ban for “no-cost political communications.”180 Under this excep-
tion, “certain communications that are made in the ordinary 
course of a 501(c)(3) organization’s regular and customary ex-
empt-purpose activities and that do not involve an expenditure 
of funds do not constitute participation or intervention in a po-
litical campaign.”181 Third, for activities outside of the no-cost 
political communications exception, the Commission suggests 
that only the following actions should be deemed prohibited po-
litical intervention: (a) a communication that involves an ex-
penditure of funds, clearly identifies a political candidate, par-
ty, or organization and contains express words of advocacy to 
elect, defeat, or make a political contribution, or (b) a contribu-
tion of money, goods, services, or facilities to a political candi-
date, party, or organization.182 Fourth, the Commission propos-
es that the appropriate sanction for political intervention 
should be an excise tax under § 4955 rather than revocation of 
tax-exempt status unless the intervention is “willful and sub-
stantial or frequent in relation to an organization’s activities as 
a whole.”183 Finally, the Commission recommends the repeal of 
 
 175. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3. 
 176. See Press Release, Comm’n on Accountability & Policy for Religious 
Orgs., New Solutions Proposed to Congress on Political Speech of Clergy and 
Religious Leaders by National Commission of Religious and Nonprofit Leaders 
(Aug. 14, 2013), http://religiouspolicycommission.org/Content/Commission 
-Press-Release-8-14-2013. 
 177. See id. 
 178. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.  
 179. See id. at 27. 
 180. Id. at 28. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See id. at 31–32. 
 183. Id. at 33. 
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26 U.S.C. § 7409, which gives the IRS authority to obtain an in-
junction prohibiting a § 501(c)(3) organization from making po-
litical expenditures.184 
3. Brighter Lines but an Imperfect Solution 
A comparison of these proposed sets of rules illustrates 
that they have some points of agreement but approach the solu-
tion differently. Both agree to an extent that expending an ex-
empt organization’s resources to support a candidate should be 
deemed political intervention.185 Both also draw on the notion of 
“express advocacy” to narrow the definition of political inter-
vention.186 The Commission’s most significant change would be 
the creation of the no-cost political communication exception to 
the political activity ban.187 This proposal significantly broadens 
the activities that an organization can undertake without fear 
of crossing the line into prohibited political activity. The BLP’s 
proposed rules would also expand the scope of protected activi-
ties but would do so through a more complex set of rules and 
safe harbors. Both groups use the phrase “brighter lines” in de-
scribing their proposed rules,188 qualifying any claim that the 
new rules are completely clear. Indeed, each proposal leaves 
open some gray areas in which organizations may be left con-
fused. For example, under the BLP proposal, rule six refers to 
“close election[s]” as a factor for determining when an organiza-
tion is engaged in political intervention.189 Whether something 
is a “close election” may depend on the particular race, the 
number of candidates, and the importance of the outcome for a 
 
 184. See id. at 34. 
 185. Compare BLP Draft Report, supra note 161, at 4 (proposing that it is 
political intervention “to provide any of the organizations resources . . . if the 
transferee uses such resources to support or oppose any candidate’s election to 
public office,” with a few exceptions), with COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, 
at 31–32 (proposing that it should be deemed political intervention to 
“contribut[e] money, goods, services, or use of facilities to one or more political 
candidates, political parties, or political organizations”). 
 186. Compare BLP Draft Report, supra note 161, at 2 (suggesting that “[i]t 
is political intervention to expressly advocate” for a specific candidate or par-
ty), with COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 31–32 (proposing that it 
should be deemed political intervention to expend funds and communicate 
“express words of advocacy” on behalf of a candidate). 
 187. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 28. 
 188. Id. at 32; see Bright Lines Project, The Bright Lines Project: Clarifying 
IRS Rules on Political Intervention: Drafting Committee Explanation 6 (July 
2013) (interim draft), http://www.citizen.org/documents/Bright%20Lines% 
20Project%20Explanation.pdf. 
 189. BLP Draft Report, supra note 161, at 4. 
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particular community.190 In addition, rule six allows organiza-
tions to raise defenses to IRS enforcement based on the unique 
facts and circumstances surrounding their activity.191 This 
again leaves room for discretion in considering what factors 
may warrant a deviation from the other bright-line rules. The 
Commission’s definition of “no-cost political communications” 
also raises issues for clear enforcement because it requires the 
IRS and organizations to identify which activities are “in the 
ordinary course of a 501(c)(3) organization’s regular and cus-
tomary exempt-purpose activities.”192 These ambiguities do not 
render these proposed sets of rules ineffective in clarifying the 
contours of the political activity ban. They are simply worth 
noting to illustrate that even the most comprehensive and care-
fully-drafted rules leave room for interpretation. A new set of 
rules may answer many questions but would still leave room 
for IRS discretion in enforcing the prohibition.  
Although they indeed provide brighter lines for implement-
ing the ban, both proposals also depend on a Congressional re-
vision to § 501(c)(3) or the development of new IRS regulations. 
Without either institution taking the necessary steps to imple-
ment comprehensive reform, the political activity ban will re-
main unchanged and organizations will continue to be left 
without meaningful guidance. This Note does not challenge 
that these proposals might legitimately resolve the ambiguities 
in the political activity ban but suggests that the IRS adopt a 
smaller change with a more immediate impact. The next Sec-
tion illustrates what such a change might involve by revisiting 
the IRS’s enforcement activities in PACI. 
C. REVISITING PACI 
The IRS’s efforts to increase compliance with § 501(c)(3)’s 
political activity ban through the PACI initiatives in 2004, 
2006, and 2008 might be characterized as an attempted solu-
tion to the problems inherent in the provision. This Section will 
review that attempt and explain how the IRS missed its oppor-
tunity to clarify its enforcement of the rule. It will first illus-
trate how PACI failed to resolve the ambiguities in its applica-
tion of the facts and circumstances test. It will then conclude by 
discussing the taxpayer privacy protections that limited the 
 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id. 
 192. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 28 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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IRS’s ability to comprehensively report its activities in a mean-
ingful way. 
1. PACI’s Limited Success 
The IRS’s first PACI Report illustrates that it was aware of 
the problems generated by the rule. The IRS identified several 
challenges it faced in implementing the rule, including First 
Amendment concerns,193 limited sanctions and the harsh effects 
of revocation,194 and the ambiguity of the facts and circum-
stances approach.195 Despite acknowledging these many prob-
lems, the IRS did not make any particularly meaningful steps 
toward a solution through PACI. 
The PACI reports do little to clarify how the facts and cir-
cumstances test may be applied in any given scenario. At best, 
they give § 501(c)(3) organizations an idea of which general 
categories of activity may be more likely deemed political than 
others. For example, the 2004 PACI Report identifies the fol-
lowing data patterns: out of twenty-four cases relating to the 
distribution of printed documents, nine cases were deemed po-
litical intervention; out of seven cases relating to political con-
tributions made to a candidate, five were deemed political in-
tervention; out of eleven cases relating to candidates speaking 
at exempt organization functions, nine were deemed political 
intervention; and out of fourteen cases involving distribution of 
voter guides, four were deemed political intervention.196 Similar 
data is presented for nine categories of intervention.197 This da-
ta does little more than suggest that when the IRS enforces 
§ 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban, the answer is almost always 
“it depends.”  
The IRS’s PACI efforts did appear to have an influence on 
preventing repeat offenses by particular organizations. As the 
2006 PACI Report states, “[t]he 2006 review of the organiza-
tions identified in the 2004 PACI found no instances of repeat 
 
 193. See 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93, at 1 (“The activities that give 
rise to questions of political campaign intervention also raise legitimate con-
cerns regarding freedom of speech and religious expression[.]”). 
 194. See id. at 2 (“The existing sanctions are limited to assessing penalties 
based on the amount spent on the intervention, which is often de minimis, or 
revocation, which may not be in the public interest.”). 
 195. See id. at 1 (“The Code contains no bright line test for evaluating polit-
ical intervention.”). 
 196. See id. at 16–17. 
 197. See id.  
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political intervention.”198 For those particular organizations in-
vestigated in 2004, therefore, perhaps the PACI efforts helped 
them to better understand what activities they should avoid in 
the future. On the other hand, it may be that these organiza-
tions were simply more cautious in subsequent years and 
avoided activities that might be deemed political intervention. 
Regardless of what this outcome suggests, it applies only to 
those organizations investigated in 2004. For the remaining 
§ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations throughout the country 
seeking to comply with the ban, PACI was not much help.  
2. Privacy as a Barrier to Understanding 
Another problem that the IRS acknowledged in its PACI ef-
forts was its limited ability to discuss its enforcement actions 
based on the disclosure restrictions under 26 U.S.C. § 6103.199 
The relevant restriction prohibits the IRS from disclosing 
“[r]eturns and return information.”200 The statute defines “re-
turn information” with a lengthy list including a taxpayer’s 
identity, exemptions, liability, and any written determination 
not otherwise subject to public inspection.201 This subsection 
concludes with the exception that return information “does not 
include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or oth-
erwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.”202  
Court precedent provides some clarification regarding the 
types of information protected under § 6103 and that which 
may be properly disclosed. In Church of Scientology of Califor-
nia v. IRS, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of the excep-
tion to the general rule against disclosure, suggesting that 
“Congress did not intend the statute to allow the disclosure of 
otherwise confidential return information merely by the redac-
tion of identifying details.”203 Rather, the exception was intend-
ed to allow the IRS to disclose “statistical studies and other 
compilations of data” similar to those that the IRS had routine-
ly prepared prior to the adoption of § 6103.204 Subsequent cases 
have similarly drawn a distinction between taxpayer-specific 
 
 198. 2006 PACI REPORT, supra note 100, at 5. 
 199. See 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93, at 1 (“The disclosure re-
strictions of IRC section 6103 limit IRS’s ability to discuss its enforcement ac-
tions.”); see also 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012).  
 200. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a).  
 201. Id. § 6103(b)(2). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 16 (1987). 
 204. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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information and aggregate taxpayer information compiled for 
analysis.205 Such data compilations need not only include raw 
numbers, charts, and graphs; such data may also include sub-
stantive information about relevant investigative facts and the 
IRS’s own legal analysis.206 The key distinction between tax-
payer-specific information and analytical data compilations ex-
plains why the IRS was able to report trends in its PACI en-
forcement activities but felt constrained by § 6103 from 
providing further detail. 
Commentators have highlighted § 6103 as a major limita-
tion in effective enforcement of the political activity ban.207 To 
remedy this issue, scholars have suggested solutions ranging 
from creating an independent Commission to investigate politi-
cal activity ban violations and report on its decisions208 to sim-
pler solutions such as making redacted versions of revocation 
notices available to the public.209 As one scholar suggests, “the 
IRS must take steps to consider how to create a public record of 
investigative results and investigative reasoning while main-
taining the integrity of the privacy statute.”210 This Note will 
build on these proposals to suggest practical ways that the IRS 
 
 205. Compare Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 614–16 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(allowing disclosure of legal analysis contained within IRS memoranda be-
cause such analysis was not taxpayer specific), with Landmark Legal Found. 
v. IRS, 267 F.3d 1132, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (prohibiting disclosure of a third 
party’s requests for information about audits of tax-exempt organizations due 
to the requests’ “taxpayer-specific character”). 
 206. See, e.g., Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d at 614 (cataloguing various interpre-
tations of the word “data” in Supreme Court cases). 
 207. See, e.g., OMB WATCH, THE IRS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ENFORCEMENT 
PROGRAM FOR CHARITIES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS: QUESTIONS AND 
CONCERNS 10 (2006) (“Because Section 6103 of the tax code prohibits the IRS 
from disclosing information about its investigations, the exact facts and cir-
cumstances the agency believes constitute partisan electioneering remain a 
mystery.” (emphasis omitted)); Blair, supra note 82, at 427 (“Because of the 
confidentiality requirement, churches do not have clear guidance regarding 
the circumstances under which an investigation will be started or what activi-
ties are permissible or impermissible.”); Tobin, supra note 105, at 1355–56 
(summarizing the effect of § 6103’s privacy provision on the enforcement of the 
political activity ban). 
 208. See Tobin, supra note 105, at 1359–60. 
 209. See OMB WATCH, supra note 207, at 13 (“[R]edacted versions of advi-
sory letters or notices of revocation of exempt status would give charities and 
religious organizations a clearer idea of what activities they should avoid.”); 
Guinane, supra note 160, at 167 (“Redacted copies of IRS determinations and 
warning letters would at least give 501(c)(3)s some idea of how the IRS applies 
the ‘facts-and-circumstances’ test to specific situations.”). 
 210. Backus, supra note 153, at 335. 
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can communicate its enforcement efforts to increase transpar-
ency and understanding.  
Although the IRS knew the problems underlying its en-
forcement of the political activity ban, it failed to directly re-
spond with a permanent solution. However, this missed oppor-
tunity should not be understood to suggest that the IRS has 
completely lost its chance at contributing to reform. The IRS 
was able to develop the PACI program without adopting new 
regulations or waiting for Congressional change. With minor 
improvements to its processes, the IRS can implement a new 
solution that more appropriately responds to the problems with 
the political activity ban. 
For decades scholars have proposed solutions to improve 
IRS enforcement of the political activity ban, approaching the 
issue from a variety of perspectives. Momentum has increased 
in the past year as the BLP and the Commission submitted 
formal rule change proposals to Congress and the IRS. The IRS 
itself has sought to address the problem through the PACI pro-
gram and experienced limited success. Building on these devel-
opments, Part III of this Note proposes procedural changes that 
the IRS should adopt to increase transparency and understand-
ing among § 501(c)(3) organizations. 
III.  GREATER TRANSPARENCY IS NEEDED IN IRS 
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS   
This Part proposes that the IRS adopt new procedures to 
routinely publicize useful information about its enforcement ef-
forts against § 501(c)(3) organizations engaging in potentially 
prohibited activity. Section A describes the mechanics of the 
proposed procedures. Section B identifies the benefits of the 
proposal, considering short-term and long-term results.  
A. PROPOSED PROCEDURES TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND 
UNDERSTANDING 
Organizations exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) must 
have appropriate guidance for complying with the political ac-
tivity ban. A comprehensive rule change may address this prob-
lem, but there is a more manageable solution that would pro-
vide consistent and useful information for these organizations. 
In order to clarify its enforcement efforts around the § 501(c)(3) 
political activity ban, the IRS should adopt the following proce-
dures: 
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1. Reporting on section 501(c)(3) investigations. 
 Twice annually, the Internal Revenue Service will re-
lease a report identifying every completed investigation of a 
tax-exempt organization under the political activity ban. The  
report will identify— 
 (a) the events leading to the investigation,  
  (b) the facts and circumstances that the Internal Reve-
nue Service considered in its determination regarding whether 
political intervention occurred,  
 (c) whether the Internal Revenue Service determined  
that political intervention occurred and why,  
 (d) what, if any, penalties were imposed, and  
 (e) whether the organization was religious or secular.  
 
2. Inviting disclosure of protected information. 
 (a) For every completed investigation initiated under sec-
tion 501(c)(3)’s prohibition on political activity, the Internal 
Revenue Service will invite organizations to waive their disclo-
sure protections under § 6103 as they relate to the investiga-
tion.  
  (b) To avoid improper disclosure of protected information 
for organizations that choose not to waive these protections, the 
Internal Revenue Service must present its results in a form 
which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly 
or indirectly, a particular taxpayer. 
 
The IRS’s 2004 and 2006 PACI Reports revealed similar in-
formation such as the number of investigations it pursued, re-
sults of its investigations, sanctions imposed, types of activities 
investigated, and trends among secular and religious organiza-
tions.211 This Note builds on the PACI Reports to suggest that 
the IRS increase its transparency by providing more useful in-
formation for § 501(c)(3) organizations such as the actual facts 
and circumstances the IRS considers in its investigations. Alt-
hough the IRS may not disclose return information under 26 
U.S.C. § 6103, it can lawfully report on its enforcement activi-
ties within the parameters of § 6103’s limitations by crafting its 
reports to avoid improper disclosure.212 Such reports would pro-
 
 211. See 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93; 2006 PACI REPORT, supra note 
100. 
 212. For example, the IRS could report its § 501(c)(3) enforcement activities 
in a similar form as the manner in which it publishes Technical Advice Memo-
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vide useful and much-needed information to affected organiza-
tions about the IRS’s enforcement of the political activity ban. 
B. SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED 
REGIME  
A primary benefit of the proposed solution is that it will 
have immediate results for organizations seeking to plan their 
activities while avoiding improper involvement in political af-
fairs. In addition, the proposal will have lasting benefits if the 
IRS or Congress moves forward in amending the rule. This Sec-
tion describes these immediate and long-term benefits. 
1. Immediate Benefits 
First, the proposed procedures will clarify how the IRS ap-
plies the facts and circumstances test to enforce the political ac-
tivity ban. By reporting the details of each investigation it con-
ducts, the IRS will give organizations a much clearer sense of 
how it applies the rule. As mentioned, the IRS has made at-
tempts to provide similar information to organizations through 
guidance such as Revenue Ruling 2007-41.213 It has also pub-
lished various guides that reiterate the facts and circumstances 
test along with example scenarios.214 The examples in these 
sources provide only limited guidance because they are not nec-
essarily based on actual investigations. They also oversimplify 
the real-life circumstances that organizations encounter by an-
alyzing individual activities in isolation.215 Reported instances 
of real activities would better advise organizations seeking to 
understand what is permissible.  
 
randa, guidance issued by the Office of Chief Counsel that “provide[s] the in-
terpretation of proper application of tax laws, tax treaties, regulations, reve-
nue rulings or other precedents” to a specific taxpayer’s situation. Technical 
Advice Memorandum, IRS (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/ 
Technical-Advice-Memorandum. When publishing such information, the IRS 
removes information that could identify a particular taxpayer and replaces it 
with a generic identifier. Id.; see, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 201,350,033 
(Dec. 18, 2013) (illustrating the method by which the IRS replaces identifying 
information with identifiers such as “Taxpayer” or “Company A”). The specific 
information that the IRS must remove before publishing Technical Advice 
Memoranda is governed by statute. See 26 U.S.C. § 6110(c) (2012). See gener-
ally Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 615–16 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (discussing 
Technical Advice Memoranda in considering how § 6103 should apply to legal 
analyses contained in IRS documents). 
 213. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. 
 214. See, e.g., Tax Guide, supra note 7, at 7–15.  
 215. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1422 (“Note that each of the-
se situations involves only one type of activity.”). 
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Some may argue that this proposal fails to clarify the am-
biguity in the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban by allowing the 
IRS to maintain its case-by-case facts and circumstances ap-
proach. Many scholars and practitioners, including those in-
volved in the Commission on Accountability and Policy for Re-
ligious Organizations and the Bright Lines Project, advocate 
replacing the current approach with a set of more clearly de-
fined rules.216 Current IRS enforcement of the political activity 
ban under the facts and circumstances test is admittedly vague 
and unpredictable, but it can be clarified without adopting a 
new set of rules. The IRS enforces many of its provisions based 
on fact-specific inquiries, and taxpayers must often comply with 
rules interpreted under a facts and circumstances analysis.217 
In these situations, taxpayers turn to case law or revenue rul-
ings to predict how the law will apply to their specific circum-
stances. Given the shortage of case law on the application of 
the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban, these procedures will fill 
the gap by providing a comprehensive body of real-life exam-
ples that organizations can consider in planning their activi-
ties.218 
Second, the proposed solution can be implemented without 
a formal rule change by the IRS or Congress. Like the 2004, 
2006, and 2008 PACI programs, the IRS can implement these 
procedures and publicly report the results of its investigations 
on its own.219 Separate from the more formal guidance con-
tained in Treasury Regulations or Revenue Rulings,220 the IRS 
routinely reports the results of its enforcement activities to the 
 
 216. See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text. 
 217. See generally Richard J. Kovach, Bright Lines, Facts and Circum-
stances Tests, and Complexity in Federal Taxation, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1287, 
1312–17 (1996) (describing the “[w]idespread use of facts and circumstances 
determinations” in tax law and noting the challenges for practitioners and 
taxpayers who regularly encounter such tests). 
 218. Cf. Tobin, supra note 105, at 1358 (“Because practitioners generally 
use case law to advise taxpayers with regard to tests that rely on facts and cir-
cumstances, the dearth of cases makes it very difficult for a practitioner to de-
termine what is, and what is not, permissible political activity.”). 
 219. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 7801 (2012) (delegating enforcement of the 
Internal Revenue Code to the Secretary of the Treasury); The Agency, Its Mis-
sion and Statutory Authority, IRS (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/The 
-Agency,-its-Mission-and-Statutory-Authority (“The IRS is organized to carry 
out the responsibilities of the secretary of the Treasury under section 7801 of 
the Internal Revenue Code.”).  
 220. For a concise summary of the most common sources of formal IRS 
guidance, see Understanding IRS Guidance - A Brief Primer, IRS (Feb. 2, 
2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-IRS-Guidance-A-Brief-Primer. 
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public.221 This Note recommends that the IRS regularly engage 
in such reporting in the area of § 501(c)(3) political activity. 
These informal reports may not be authoritative precedent 
which would bind the IRS in its subsequent enforcement activi-
ties, but they could greatly increase organizations’ understand-
ing of how the IRS enforces § 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban.  
Developing a new set of comprehensive Treasury Regula-
tions would not be an easy task,222 and the success of any Con-
gressional change would depend on how the IRS actually im-
plemented it.223 The proposed procedural changes provide a 
manageable alternative that could be adopted prior to the next 
election cycle. Because the political activity ban raises sensitive 
issues ranging from free speech and religious freedom to the 
transparency of campaign financing and intervention, any new 
proposal will invite more debate and criticism. In the hopes of 
limiting such criticism, this Note offers a moderate step with 
practical results. 
Although they could be easily adopted, the proposed proce-
dures may raise privacy concerns by making information about 
§ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations publicly available. A few 
considerations indicate why this may not be such a serious is-
sue. As mentioned, the IRS regularly reports on its enforce-
ment activities in other areas224 and did so following the 2004 
and 2006 PACI programs.225 In addition, multiple organizations 
singled out for enforcement under the political activity ban 
have willingly revealed information relating to IRS enforce-
ment activities in the past.226 Following these examples, some 
 
 221. See, e.g., Compliance & Enforcement News, IRS (Aug. 28, 2014), http:// 
www.irs.gov/uac/Compliance-&-Enforcement-News.  
 222. The IRS’s recent effort to adopt new political intervention rules for 
§ 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations illustrates the arduous task of develop-
ing regulations. As the IRS emphasized in its press release announcing the 
proposed regulations, “[t]here are a number of steps in the regulatory process 
that must be taken before any final guidance can be issued.” I.R.S. News Re-
lease IR-2013-92 (Nov. 26, 2013); cf. Aprill, supra note 25, at 683 (“The IRS 
should undertake the difficult work of writing a set of rules for the campaign 
intervention prohibition.”). 
 223. See, e.g., Fresco, supra note 8, at 3055 (“The effectiveness of any pro-
posal will depend largely on how the IRS enforces the prohibition.”). 
 224. See Compliance & Enforcement News, supra note 221.  
 225. See 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93; 2006 PACI REPORT, supra note 
100. 
 226. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 25–26 (describing how 
the NAACP publicly announced that it was being investigated by the IRS and 
released a letter it had received from the IRS to the public); see also Blair, su-
pra note 82, at 430–32 (explaining how an IRS investigation of church political 
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organizations will likely be willing to reveal information about 
the investigations in order to increase transparency around the 
IRS’s enforcement actions. Further, for activities that are al-
ready public in nature (publishing literature, maintaining a 
website, making public comments), organizations would be re-
vealing little about their own activities by allowing the IRS to 
report publicly on its investigation.227 Despite these considera-
tions, some organizations may legitimately wish to keep their 
actions private and maintain the taxpayer privacy protections 
under 26 U.S.C. § 6103. The proposed solution gives organiza-
tions this option while encouraging disclosure as a valid alter-
native. 
A final short-term benefit of this Note’s proposal is its im-
pact on the continued debate over IRS enforcement in this area. 
The proposed reports would inform public debate around the 
ban by providing concrete information about the number and 
type of investigations being pursued by the IRS. The current 
secrecy around IRS enforcement in this area raises questions 
about selective enforcement and may lead to misunderstand-
ings about the actual number of violations by § 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt organizations. The IRS acknowledged this problem in 
its 2004 PACI Report, suggesting that “media reports on the 
activities of a small representation of [over one million 501(c)(3) 
organizations] can, rightly or wrongly, create an impression of 
widespread noncompliance.”228 Because PACI involved a con-
certed effort to increase investigations and enforcement, how-
ever, its results did not necessarily clear up any of these mis-
conceptions. This Note’s proposal would provide a more 
accurate picture of the extent of prohibited activity taking 
place. This in turn would inform the public debate and allow a 
more reasoned analysis of the current situation.  
2. Long-Term Benefits 
As one scholar has suggested, “[s]hort term improvements 
can help provide better guidance while the long-term task of 
developing bright-line rules is underway.”229 Although a com-
 
activity became public when the church issued a press release).  
 227. See 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93, at 2 (“The questionable activi-
ties are public.”). But see id. (“The activities . . . can be difficult to document, 
because they often involve events and statements that may not be recorded or 
otherwise captured.”).  
 228. 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93, at 2. 
 229. Guinane, supra note 160, at 167. 
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prehensive rule change would be much harder to implement, 
scholars and the public are indeed pressing for such a change. 
If Congress or the IRS chooses to promulgate new rules in this 
area, the proposed reporting procedures will lay important 
groundwork for embarking on this task. The § 501(c)(3) politi-
cal activity ban was adopted with no study or debate about the 
rationale behind the rule or its practical effects on § 501(c)(3) 
organizations. This may explain why the current rule has prov-
en so difficult for the IRS to enforce. As one commentator sug-
gests, the laws relating to the political activity ban could be re-
written “to better reflect the current state of political 
involvement by section 501(c)(3) organizations.”230 Adopting the 
proposed procedural changes would shed light on the current 
situation and ensure that any new rules reflect reality.  
The proposed procedures could also provide a better picture 
of how secular and religious organizations vary in their politi-
cal involvement. As mentioned, much of the debate around the 
political activity ban singles out churches and religious organi-
zations for unique consideration. The current rule is applied in 
the same manner regardless of whether the organization is 
secular or religious. Without a clear body of examples on how 
the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban is enforced and applied 
against secular and religious organizations, Congress may have 
difficulty discerning whether a separate rule is appropriate. 
This Note’s proposed reports would allow Congress and the IRS 
to see whether a separate rule for religious organizations is 
needed and would illuminate what differences, if any, exist in 
the political engagement of secular and religious § 501(c)(3) or-
ganizations.  
Although this Note’s proposal may prove useful in facilitat-
ing a more formal rule change, it should not be seen as a solu-
tion that will become unnecessary after the adoption of new 
guidelines for § 501(c)(3) organizations. Twice-annual reporting 
on the IRS’s enforcement in this area would be useful regard-
less of whether the current standard is maintained or new 
rules are adopted. Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations—
particularly small charities, churches, and schools—are less 
likely to seek out formal legal advice in planning their activities 
than other organizations with more resources to spare.231 
 
 230. Prather, supra note 145, at 159. 
 231. See Aprill, supra note 25, at 667 (explaining that a large number of 
§ 501(c)(3) organizations are very small and thus “unlikely to devote scarce 
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Transparent enforcement will continue to be useful for these 
organizations even if a more concrete set of rules is adopted. 
Further, continued reporting will allow the IRS and the public 
to assess whether any new rules are being implemented in a 
fair and consistent manner.  
The IRS should adopt this proposal by reporting consist-
ently on its enforcement of the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban. 
Such increased transparency will clarify how the IRS applies 
the facts and circumstances test in enforcing the prohibition, 
and it can be implemented without a complex rule change. Fur-
ther, this proposal will inform public and scholarly debate and 
will have long-term benefits if Congress or the IRS decides to 
amend the prohibition.  
  CONCLUSION   
The political activity ban codified in 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) 
has caused confusion and frustration for § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt 
organizations for decades. The prohibition’s sparse legislative 
history and ambiguous text, limited Revenue Rulings, and min-
imal case law offer little guidance for compliance. Although the 
IRS has attempted to enforce the provision rigorously through 
its PACI efforts, § 501(c)(3) organizations and the public re-
main confused.  
In response to this lack of clarity, scholars have proposed a 
variety of reforms, including two comprehensive sets of pro-
posed rules recently submitted to Congress. Although these 
measures may provide some clarification, they depend on Con-
gress or the IRS to be fully implemented. This Note proposes a 
more immediate and manageable solution to increase transpar-
ency and understanding. To clarify its application of the 
§ 501(c)(3) political activity ban, the IRS should consistently 
report on its investigation and enforcement activities in this 
area. This solution offers an immediate response to the prob-
lem, allowing § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations to focus on 
their charitable, religious, and educational goals. 
 
 
resources to engage professionals to help them interpret the current stand-
ards”). 
